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Criminal Procedure-Oliver v. United States: The Open Fields
Doctrine Survives Katz
A police officer enters a privately owned field in search of evidence of crimi-
nal activity. The officer has acted on an anonymous tip-with no indication of
reliability-and has failed to secure a search warrant. The area that he probes is
fenced, remote from any dwelling, and posted with no-trespassing signs; the
owner has done all she can to create an expectation of privacy. According to the
recent Supreme Court pronouncement in Oliver v. United States, I the officer's
search does not violate the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches.2 Any evidence discovered during the search is admissible at trial.3
Oliver offered the Court an opportunity to determine the viability of the
open fields doctrine, which allows government agents to conduct warrantless
open fields searches, 4 in light of a Warren-era ruling that required a warrant to
search any place in which a defendant has a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy."5 The Court decided that even under the reasonable-expectation-of-pri-
vacy rule-or perhaps in spite of the rule-the open fields doctrine remains the
law.6 This Note will examine the open fields doctrine, as reaffirmed by Oliver,
from both a historical and a practical perspective.
The Oliver holding decided two cases: Oliver v. United States and Maine v.
Thornton.7 In the former, agents of the Kentucky State Police received an anon-
ymous tip that marijuana was being grown on Oliver's farm and decided to in-
vestigate immediately without obtaining a search warrant or Oliver's consent. 8
They entered his land by automobile on a private road, passing several "no tres-
passing" signs and continuing three-quarters of a mile past Oliver's house.
Although the road was blocked by a metal gate also marked with a "no trespass-
ing" sign, the officers passed the gate on foot through a gap in the fence. They
travelled down a dirt path past a barn and a truck camper; a man then appeared
and shouted for them to go no farther. The officers identified themselves and
turned back to speak to the man but could not find him. They resumed their
search and followed the path through a wooded area to a field of marijuana.
The field was surrounded by woods, fences, and an embankment; it could be
1. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1744.
4. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
5. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1744.
7. Id. Oliver affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decision,
United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), and reversed the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court decision, Maine v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982).
8. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd, 104 S, Ct. 1735
(1984).
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seen only from the air.9
Based on this discovery, Oliver was arrested and charged with growing ma-
rijuana.10 At an evidentiary hearing, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky suppressed the evidence relating to the discovery
of the marijuana. 1 Relying on the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy rule enun-
ciated in Katz v. United States,' 2 the court determined that defendant had cre-
ated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the field. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, reversed the suppression order en
banc. 1 3 The court ruled that the open fields doctrine had survived Katz intact,
reasoning that "the human relations that create the need for privacy do not
ordinarily take place in [open fields], and that the property owner's common law
right to exclude trespassers is insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the
Fourth Amendment's protection."' 4 Thus, any expectation of privacy that an
owner had in an open field was unreasonable as a matter of law and therefore
gave rise to no protection under Katz.15
In Maine v. Thornton 16 two police officers, acting on an anonymous tip that
marijuana was being grown in the woods behind defendant's home, entered
Thornton's land by a path between his home and a neighbor's house. In the
woods they discoverd two marijuana patches surrounded by chicken wire. After
verifying that the marijuana was on defendant's land, the officers obtained a
search warrant, seized the marijuana, and arrested Thornton.' 7 The trial court
suppressed the evidence obtained in the second search, finding that the warrant
was based on information produced by an unreasonable prior search. The court
concluded that the no-trespassing signs and the secluded location of the mari-
9. Id. at 358.
10. Id. Oliver was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1982) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
Section 841 provides:
(a) Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a
counterfeit substance.
Section 2 provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
11. United States v. Oliver, No. CR-80-0005-BG, slip op. (W.D. Ky. Nov. 19, 1980) (order
suppressing marijuana evidence), aff'd, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd en banc, 686 F.2d 356
(1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (1982) (en bane), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984). A
panel of judges previously had affirmed the district court. United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85, 88
(6th Cir. 1981).
14. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 360 (1982) (en banc), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
15. Id.
16. 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
17. Id. at 491.
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juana gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.18 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine affirmed. 19 It agreed with the trial court's reasoning, but also
went a step further to state that the open fields doctrine applied only when of-
ficers are lawfully present on the property and observe open and patent
activity. 20
To understand Oliver, it is necessary to review the history of the prohibi-
tions provided by the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Framers' intention to provide such protection was inspired largely
by the abusive practices of the British colonial authorities. Before the American
Revolution, colonists were subjected to searches and seizures pursuant to writs
of assistance.21 These documents were intended to assist British colonial au-
thorities in preventing the colonists from trading with non-British industry in
violation of the Mercantile Acts.22 Although justifiable from the viewpoint of
British mercantilism, the writs were inherently abusive. The writs issued with-
out any showing of probable cause; they were general-they authorized the
search of any place for any item-and they were permanent in that they re-
mained valid until six months after the sovereign's death.23 Under such a sys-
tem, abuses were inevitable and indeed were widespread. 24
18. Id. at 492.
19. Id. at 493.
20. Id. at 495.
21. Writs of assistance are considered to have been one of the fundamental causes of the Ameri-
can Revolution. See Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the American Revolution in THE
ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40 (1939).
George II died in October 1760. By law, all writs of assistance would expire six months later in
March 1761. A group of Boston merchants represented by James Otis, Jr., unsuccessfully opposed
their reissuance in the Superior Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. See J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 33-37 (1966); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 57-66
(1937). A youthful John Adams was present as a spectator. Fifty years later he wrote: "[Otis] was a
flame of fire. . . . Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to
take arms against writs of assistance. . . . Then and there the Child Independence was born. In
fifteen years, namely in 1776, he grew up to manhood, and declared himself free." 10 C. ADAMS,
THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 276 (1856), quoted in J. LANDYNSKI, supra, at 37. Adams,
writing to his wife Abigail to inform her of the resolution of independence passed by the Second
Continental Congress, remembered Otis' argument as the first link in the "Chain of Causes and
Effects" leading to independence. 2 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 28 (L. Butterfield ed,
1963).
Even after hostilities had begun, the Continental Congress petitioned George III for a redress of
grievances. Among them, they complained that, "The officers of the customs are empowered to
break open and enter houses, without the authority of any civil magistrate, founded on legal infor-
mation." Petition from Continental Congress to King George III (Oct. 26, 1774), quoted In N.
LASsON, supra, at 75.
22. See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623, 625 (1886) (origin and purpose of
the fourth amendment); J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 21, at 30-31 (origin of the fourth amendment);
N. LASSON, supra note 21, at 51, 53 (writs of assistance in the colonies).
23. N. LASSON, supra note 21, at 53-54, 57.
24. Id. at 53-57; see also J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 21, at 31 (writs granted unlimited discretion
to royal officers). A contemporary view of the abusiveness of the writs of assistance is found in the
statement of a committee of Bostonians appointed in 1772 to state the rights of the colonists:
Each of these petty officers. . . is entrusted with power more absolute and arbitrary
than ought to be lodged in the hands of any Man or body of Men whatsoever. . . . Thus
our Houses and even our Bed-Chambers are exposed to be ransacked. . by Wretches,
whom no prudent Man would venture to employ even as Menial Servants. . ..
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The memory of writs of assistance lingered in the minds of the Constitu-
tion's Framers.25 The fourth amendment was their response to the dangers of
unjustified government interference with the people's privacy: unreasonable
searches and seizures were forbidden 26 and search warrants, issued only on a
showing of probable cause,27 would be required. Moreover, search warrants
were required to specify the area to be searched and the persons or items
1761-1772 Mass. (Quincy) 395, 467 (appendix on writs of assistance).
25. See generally J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 21, at 39-48 (origin and purpose of the fourth
amendment); N. LASSON, supra note 21, at 79-85 (precedents of fourth amendment).
The importance many postcolonial leaders attached to denying the federal government a gen-
eral search power is reflected in the Ratification Debates that followed the 1787 Constitutional Con-
vention. Virginia, after a sharp debate, ratified the Constitution, but also recommended a bill of
rights with strong provisions against unreasonable searches. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 21, at 40; N.
LASSON, supra note 21, at 95-96. North Carolina made a similar recommendation. J. LANDYNSKI,
supra note 21, at 40. New York's recommendations upon ratification included a reference to "free-
dom from unreasonable searches and seizures." 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 362 (J. Elliot ed. 1836). Seven states
already had constitutional restrictions regarding searches and seizures prior to the Constitutional
Convention. N. LASSON, supra note 21, at 82.
The vividness of certain statements made during the ratification debates typifies the hostility of
many leaders to general search powers. Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts delegate who refused to
sign the Constitution because it lacked a bill of rights, wrote:
"There is no provision by a bill of rights to guard against the dangerous encroachments of
power in too many instances to be named: but I cannot pass over in silence the insecurity
in which we are left with regard to warrants unsupported by evidence-the daring experi-
ment of granting writs of assistance in a former arbitrary administration is not yet forgotten
in Massachusetts."
N. LASSON, supra note 21, at 89 n.40 (quoting 2 FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PA-
PERS 723 (E. Scott ed. 1894)).
In Virginia, Patrick Henry argued that failure to include a bill of rights would produce a general
search power:
Excisemen may come in multitudes; for the limitation of their number no man knows.
They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some similar
restriction, go into your cellars and rooms, and measure everything you eat, drink, or wear.
They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 414 (J. Elliot ed. 1836).
The Framers also were influenced by the battle against general warrants in England. In Eng-
land, general warrants had been used to restrict freedom of the press by conferring a virtually limit-
less power to seek out objectionable publications. In 1765 damages were awarded to a victim of a
search conducted under a general warrant in Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). The
following year Parliament virtually banned general warrants. For a more detailed discussion, see
Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 724-39 (1961); N. LASSON, supra note 21, 1-
50.
26. The fourth amendment does not define an unreasonable search, nor is the relationship be-
tween the unreasonable search clause and the warrant clause clear from the text. As Landynski
states, the fourth amendment has "both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity." J.
LANDYNSKI, supra note 21, at 42. The Supreme Court generally has regarded warrantless searches
as unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.").
For a discussion of the rule and its exceptions, see 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3. l(c)-(d)
(1978).
27. Probable cause is defined as "a reasonable belief from the facts and circumstances that an
offense occurred and that the suspect committed it or that evidence of that offense can be found in
the place to be searched. It is more than a mere suspicion, but not a prima facie case of guilt." J.
HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5:7 (1978). For a detailed treatment of probable cause, see 1 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 3.
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sought.28 The fourth amendment's general prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and its probable cause and particularity requirements, re-
flect a philosophy that the individual's sense of security cannot be abridged at
the government's whim; rather, intrusions on individual liberty are permissible
only when subjected to prior, independent judicial approval according to strict
standards. 29
Although this philosophy inspired the fourth amendment, it is not clear
how the Framers intended to implement the protections conferred by the fourth
amendment. At common law, all relevant evidence was admissible-that it was
obtained illegally did not matter.3 0 The aggrieved party was limited to a suit for
damages in tort.3 1 This view prevailed in the United States until the 1914
Supreme Court decision in Weeks v. United States.32 In Weeks, the Court ruled
that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in
the federal courts. 33 In 1961 this "exclusionary rule" was extended to the states
as a matter of due process under the fourteenth amendment.3 4 Thus, it now is
well settled that the remedy for an illegal search or seizure is the exclusion of
any resulting evidence at trial.3 5
A distinct issue is the scope of protection offered by the fourth amendment.
Even though the history of the amendment is clear, and the remedy for its viola-
tion established, the scope of coverage of the amendment is not. Taken literally,
the language of the amendment extends protection only against unreasonable
searches and seizures to "persons, houses, papers and effects."3- 6 In many cases,
however, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the language of the amendment
literally.37 It has accorded protection to stores,3 8 offices, 39 and sealed pack-
ages.40 The Court, however, has not construed the fourth amendment as a gen-
eral right of privacy against all government activity;41 it has held that the fourth
amendment does not apply in certain instances-when items or activities are in
plain view,42 when the object of search is abandoned property, 43 when searches
28. 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 26, § 3.1(b).
29. Id. § 3.1(a).
30. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928).
31. Id. at 463.
32. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
33. Id. at 398.
34. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
35. For a discussion of the current Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule,
see infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 2.
37. See infra notes 38-40.
38. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
39. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
40. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
41. For a discussion of the relationship between the constitutional right to privacy and the
fourth amendment, see Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: a Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 978-87 (1968).
42. See, eg., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (illict distilling committed in
discernible presence of law enforcement officer), overturned on other grounds, United States v. Rabi-
nowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
43. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1960) (items left in wastebasket of
plaintiff's hotel room after he had paid his bill and vacated the room).
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are conducted under exigent circumstances, 44 and, notably, when searches are
conducted in open fields.
4 5
In Hester v. United States46 the Court ruled that the safeguards of the
fourth amendment did not extend to an open field. In Hester, revenue officers
had staked out a field near the home of defendant's father. When they saw
Hester hand a bottle of moonshine to a suspected customer, the agents seized the
bottle and arrested Hester. Hester moved to suppress the evidence on the
ground that the search-the observation-violated the fourth amendment. 47
Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that no illegal search had
occurred. "The special protection accorded by the fourth amendment to the
people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' is not extended to the open
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common
law.",
4 8
Hester, however, did not attempt to define an open field. A definition was
implied three years later in Olmstead v. United States,49 when the Court ex-
amined the legality of warrantless wiretaps by federal prohibition officers. De-
fendant claimed that the wiretap constituted an illegal fourth amendment
search. The Court disagreed, concluding that no fourth amendment violation
could occur unless there has been an actual physical violation of defendant's
house or its curtilage. 50 Since an open field could not by definition be considered
part of the home or its curtilage5 1 the practical effect of Olmstead was to place
all areas outside the curtilage beyond the fourth amendment's protections. 52 A
44. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (liquor seized from automobile
incident to arrest of plaintiffs for illegal transportation).
45. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
46. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
47. Id. at 57-58.
48. Id. at 59. The cited passage referred to the place requirements for the common-law crime
of burglary. See infra note 51.
49. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
50. Id. at 466 ("The Fourth Amendment [is not] violated. . . unless there has been an official
search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an
actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure."). The Court
also ruled that fourth amendment protections extend only to material items and not to information.
Id. at 464. This latter interpretation eventually was discredited in Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961). In Silverman the Court reversed a decision that admitted evidence obtained by a
listening device inserted into a party wall. Although the ruling was based on a finding of a technical
trespass into defendant's home, the Court in dictum expressed its dissatisfaction with the Olmstead
rule. Olmstead was overruled six years later in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967).
See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
51. The concept of the "curtilage" originally was used to determine what buildings or areas
could be the subject of a common-law burglary. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 96, at 712 (1972). "Curtilage" is defined as the "enclosed space of ground and buildings immedi-
ately surrounding a dwelling house." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (5th ed. 1979).
52. The use of common-law property concepts to delimit the fourth amendment has been criti-
cized since its inception. Justice Brandeis argued in dissent that the majority's narrow interpretation
of the fourth amendment's language contradicted the intent of the Framers. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at
478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his opinion, a more liberal construction was necessary in light of
technological advances:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of
evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form
that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions
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precise definition of "open field" was unnecessary: the open fields doctrine of
Hester applied to any area outside the curtilage. Courts subsequently have de-
termined that wooded areas,5 3 deserts, 54 vacant lots in urban areas,5 5 beaches,56
open waters,57 reservoirs,5 8 and fenced land5 9 are open fields.
The physical-invasion-of-the-curtilage requirement eventually was aban-
doned in 1967 in Katz v. United States.60 The FBI had placed a listening device
on the outside of a telephone booth to monitor defendant's end of a conversation
concerning illegal gambling.6 1 Rather than determine whether the phone booth
was a "constitutionally protected area," the Court explicitly overruled its own
property-based rule of Omstead; determination whether a fourth amendment
violation has occurred must depend on whether the government intruded on the
privacy upon which the defendant has justifiably relied. 62 The crux of the
Court's decision was that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." 63
Katz liberated fourth amendment protections from common-law property
concepts. This result, however, was undermined by the Court's failure to formu-
late a rule for justifiable reliance on privacy.64 In his concurrence Justice Harlan
recognized this flaw and suggested a two-pronged test. "My understanding of
the rule that has emerged. . . is that there is a twofold requirement: First, that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one which society is prepared to recognize as 'rea-
sonable.' "65 The Supreme Court subsequently has employed Harlan's two-
pronged test in search and seizure cases. 66 The test, however, has proved troub-
and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth.
Id. at 472-73.
Justice Brandeis argued that the protection of the individual's privacy against unreasonable
government intrusion was the goal of the fourth amendment, noting, "As a means of espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when
compared with wire tapping." Id. at 476.
53. Bedell v. State, 257 Ark. 895, 521 S.W.2d 200 (1975); Cornman v. State, 156 Ind. App. 112,
294 N.E.2d 812 (1973).
54. State v. Caldwell, 20 Ariz. App. 331, 512 P.2d 863 (1973).
55. State v. Stavricos, 506 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. App. 1974); State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d
574 (1976).
56. Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 46, 209 S.E.2d 665, 666 (1974).
57. Nathanson v. State, 554 P.2d 456, 459 (Alaska 1976).
58. State v. Borchard, 24 Ohio App. 2d 95, 99, 264 N.E.2d 646, 648-49 (1970).
59. See Janney v. United States, 206 F.2d 601, 604 (4th Cir. 1953); see also Stark v. United
States, 44 F.2d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 1930) (open fields doctrine invoked to justify warrantless search of
a fenced-in cave).
60. 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
61. Id. at 348.
62. Id. at 351-53.
63. Id. at 351. Applying this new test, the Court held that evidence obtained by this type of
electronic eavesdropping was inadmissible.
64. Katz merely stated that defendant had a privacy interest on which he had "justifiably re-
lied." Id. at 353. The rule was not denoted as the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard
until Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
65. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
66. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 & n.12 (1978) (fourth amendment protections
[Vol. 63
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lesome, especially the second prong of the test. Even Justice Harlan, dissenting
in United States v. White,67 stated that an assessment of a socially reasonable
expectation of privacy should be based on a variety of factors. 68 He asserted
that the nature of the government intrusion and its probable impact on the indi-
vidual's sense of security must be weighed against the usefulness of the intrusion
for effective law enforcement. 69 Thus, there should be a balancing of the pub-
lic's interest in effective law enforcement and the public's interest in freedom
from government intrusion.70 The Court adopted Harlan's balancing test in
Delaware v. Prouse.
7 1
Oliver ended great confusion among the state and federal courts over the
post-Katz status of the open fields doctrine. Katz's repudiation of a property
basis for fourth amendment protection rendered the viability of the open fields
doctrine at least questionable. Even though the Supreme Court had not over-
ruled Hester explicitly-as it had overruled Olmstead-Katz cast considerable
doubt on the existence of an independent open fields rule. The Katz Court stated
bluntly that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."'72 It also
reasoned that, "[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection ....
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected."' 73 Since the open fields doctrine dealt by
definition with places, the relevance of the doctrine was left unclear. The Katz
opinion raised by implication the possibility of a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in an open field.
Prior to Oliver, the Court did little to resolve this ambiguity; it decided only
one open fields case between 1924 and 1984. In Air Pollution Variance Board v.
depend not on property rights but on a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place");
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (Individuals are protected against government intru-
sions into "legitimate expectations of privacy."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (Individuals are
entitled to a "reasonable expectation of privacy.").
The Court's initial explanation of the new fourth amendment standard was vague. The need to
rely on a test developed in a concurring opinion, however, is not necessarily reprehensible. Professor
Amsterdam offered this explanation:
The Supreme Court ordinarily must decide the case before it. It must do so even though it
is not prepared to announce the new principle in terms of comparable generality with the
old, still less to say how much the old must be displaced and whether or how the old and
new can be accommodated. If the Court declines to give birth to the new principle, it will
never acquire the experience or the insight to answer these latter questions. If it attempts
to answer them at the moment of the new principle's birth, it is not likely to answer them
wisely. Clarity and consistency are desirable, certainly, to the extent that they can be
achieved. But the temptation to achieve them by ignoring the complex and the unpredict-
able quality of real problems is fortunately less beguiling to Justices perennially faced with
responsibility for solving those problems than to the Justice's academic critics.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 352 (1974).
67. 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 786.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
72. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
73. Id. at 351-52.
1985]
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Western Alfalfa Corp.,74 the Court dealt with a warrantless entry onto factory
grounds by state inspectors to conduct an opacity test of smoke emissions. 75
The Court relied on Hester to find that no fourth amendment violation had oc-
curred, reasoning that the inspectors only had observed what was observable by
the general public on lands from which the public was not excluded. 76 The
Court, however, did not comment on what the result would have been had the
inspectors entered land from which the public had been excluded, nor did it
refer to Katz. The case did little to clarify the open fields doctrine beyond imply-
ing that a trespass alone would be insufficient to make an intrusion an illegal
search;77 it did, however, leave open the possibility that Katz would require a
warrant for searches when the public was excluded from a given area and when
activity was not publicly visible.
Since the Supreme Court had given no concrete guidance on the application
of the open fields doctrine, the state and lower federal courts were left to fashion
their own interpretations. Three positions emerged. 78 One held that the open
fields doctrine had no meaning separate from Katz-that open field searches
must be judged under a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard. 79 A second
view was that Hester remained valid because there was per se no reasonable
expectation of privacy in an open field.80 Last, a few courts held that Hester was
unaffected by Katz. 81
An apparent majority of courts adhered to the first position.82 The courts
74. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
75. Id. at 862-63.
76. Id. at 865.
77. Note, How Open are the Open Fields? United States v. Oliver, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 133, 146-
47 (1982).
78. See generally Note, Florida v. Brady: Can Katz Survive in Open Fields?, 32 Am. U.L. REv.
921, 930-33 (1983) (articulating two positions: open fields doctrine seen as "independent from and
unaffected by Katz" and open field searches' validity determined under Katz) [hereinafter referred to
as Note, Can Katz Survive?]; Note, supra note 77, at 145-46 (presenting three views of the open
fields doctrine: still "substantially intact," without "any meaning independent of a Katz-type analy-
sis," and "no longer valid fourth amendment law").
79. Note, Can Katz Survive?, supra note 78, at 930.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 931-32.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.) (no "legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy" in private land clearly visible from public road and easily observable by outsiders who could
enter property at will), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 121 (1982); Patterson v. National Transp. Safety Bd.,
638 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1980) (visual observation of aircraft parked in open area adjacent to runway
within "open fields" exception to fourth amendment); United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149
(4th Cir. 1980) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in unlocked trunk of "junker" car in open
area on farm leased by appellant's family to others), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); United States
v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in tarpaulin-covered
property plainly visible from private road inside unfenced, unposted area), cerl. denied, 440 U.S. 958
(1979); United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978) (no "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" in area outside and beyond curtilage, the outer limits of which are defined as walls of remote
outbuildings), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 460 P.2d 129, 81
Cal. Rptr. 457 (1969) (en bane) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy" when marijuana plant in
plain sight within 20 feet of defendant's home, to which access was not restricted); People v. Mc-
Claugherty, 193 Colo. 360, 566 P.2d 361 (1977) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in leased
pasture land accessible to ranch employees or in flatbed truck parked on private property but in
plain view of public); Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980) ("legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy" in tobacco barn on farm to which access was restricted by fence and locked gate); State v.
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reasoned that after Katz, fourth amendment analysis must focus on the privacy
and security of the individual against arbitrary invasion by government officials.
A per se open fields rule, as embodied in Hester, would be inconsistent with the
scope of fourth amendment protection as defined by Katz.
Some courts adopted the second position, that Hester survived as a per se
rule. They concluded that privacy in an open field is not an interest which soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 83 Such claims of privacy, therefore,
failed the second part of the two-pronged test established by Katz and its
progeny.
One court-the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit-held
that Hester was unaffected by Katz. 84 It relied on three arguments. First, it
noted that both the majority opinion85 and Harlan's concurrence 86 in Katz re-
Bakker, 262 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1978) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy" when possessory in-
terest in land was insufficient to deprive property owners of authority to grant consent to search);
State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978) ("legitimate expectation of privacy" in property not visible
from public road where access road was posted as private); State v. Charvat, 175 Mont. 267, 573
P.2d 660 (1978) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in property clearly visible from defendant's
abandoned home to which access was not restricted by locked gates or "no trespassing" signs); State
v. Cemper, 209 Neb. 376, 307 N.W.2d 820 (1981) (no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in open
field in which defendant had no personal ownership or possessory rights); State v. Hanson, 113 N.H.
689, 313 A.2d 730 (1973) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in garden and field not within
curtilage and not in close proximity to dwelling); State v. Chort, 91 N.M. 584, 577 P.2d 892 (Ct.
App. 1978) ("reasonable expectation of privacy" in garden shielded from public view by fence); State
v. Boone, 293 N.C. 702, 239 S.E.2d 459 (1977) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in tractor
parked in open-air lean-to shed and clearly visible from adjacent public property); State v. Walle, 52
Or. App. 963, 630 P.2d 377 (1981) ("reasonable expectation of privacy" in rural property protected
by fence and creek even though in plain view of adjacent private property); State v. Lakin, 588
S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. 1979) ("reasonable expectation of privacy" in occupied, fenced, private property
over one-half mile from public road); State v. Weigand, 289 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1982) (no "reason-
able expectation of privacy" in open field visible from public road); see also Note, Can Katz Sur-
vive?, supra note 78, at 930-31 (noting that the majority of courts had treated open fields searches as
Katz problems).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848 (11th Cir. 1982) (convictions for marijuana
importation upheld when no legitimate expectation of privacy existed in open barn); United States v.
Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976) (no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy prohibited
seizure of marijuana hidden near airport parking lot), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Patler v.
Slayton, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974) (seizure of bullets matching those from murder weapon did
not violate defendant's unreasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Brown, 487 F.2d 208
(4th Cir. 1973) ("reasonable expectation of privacy" does not extend to open fields surrounding
barns), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); DeMontmorency v. State, 401 So. 2d 858 (Fla. App. 1981)
(defendant had no "reasonable expectation of privacy" to protect marijuana grown in fenced yard
outside the curtilage of defendant's home); Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 274 S.E.2d 595
(1980) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy" exists in storage building in field surrounded by
barbed-wire fence), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
84. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735
(1984); see also Ford v. State, 264 Ark. 141, 569 S.W.2d 105 (1978) (warrantless search of rural field
in which marijuana was grown upheld as reasonable), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979); Common-
wealth v. Janek, 363 A.2d 1299, 1300 (Pa. Super. 1976) (seizure of evidence from field upheld despite
seclusion of area and posted warnings against trespassing). The Oliver court of appeals, however,
phrased its conclusion in terms of the reasonable expectation of privacy: "[W]e conclude that under
Hester and Katz any expectation of privacy that an owner might have with respect to his open field is
not, as a matter of law, an expectation that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Oliver,
686 F.2d at 360.
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.8 (1967) ("It appears to be common ground that
a private home is [a protected area] but that an open field is not. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57.").
86. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A]n enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a
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ferred to Hester and the proposition that an open field is beyond the purview of
the fourth amendment.8 7 Second, it noted that the Supreme Court had men-
tioned the open fields doctrine after Katz 88 and had not overruled it as a per se
rule.8 9 Last the court averred that Katz merely applied the fourth amendment
to a situation that the Framers could not have foreseen-conversation by tele-
phone-without affecting established doctrines. 90
Oliver preserved the open fields doctrine as a per se exception to the fourth
amendment. The Supreme Court adopted the second argument as one justifica-
tion for reaffirming Hester. Applying the second prong of Harlan's test for rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, the Court determined that privacy in an open
field was not an interest that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. It
reasoned that the nature of an open field and the activities carried on there do
not demand a high level of privacy;91 likewise, the historical distinction between
the house, including the curtilage, and outlying lands implied a low expectation
of privacy.92 Thus, the Court was able to reach a desired result-a per se open
fields exception-while adhering to the rule of precedent. 93
A quest for harmony within the rule of stare decisis, however, is not the
essence of Oliver. The Court is less interested in rationalizing its rulings than in
setting judicial policy in law enforcement. 94 Oliver's bright-line rule excluding
open fields from the fourth amendment's ambit reflects two fundamental view-
points of the current Court: that the exclusionary rule should be restricted and
that law enforcement is promoted by simple, easily applied rules.
home. . . and unlike a field, Hester v. United States, .. a person has a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy.").
87. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735
(1984); Note, supra note 78, at 932.
88. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978) (property interest may not be
sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in activity on the premises); G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977) (open fields doctrine supports constitutionality of
seizing automobiles in public areas); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (exposing
oneself to public view on doorstep of house analogized to lack of expectation of privacy when one is
completely outside one's house); Air Pollution Variance Board, 416 U.S. at 865 (when smoke emis-
sion testing conducted completely outside defendant's plant, fourth amendment not violated).
89. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735
(1984).
90. Id. at 359.
91. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741. The court noted:
open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. There is no societal in-
terest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that
occur in open fields. Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to
the public and the police in ways that a home, an office or a commercial structure would
not be. It is not generally true that fences or no trespassing signs effectively bar the public
from viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner Oliver and respondent Thorn-
ton concede that the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. For these
reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that "soci-
ety recognizes as reasonable."
Id.
92. Id. at 1742.
93. But cf. id. at 1744 (White, J., concurring) (contending that Katz analysis unnecessary in
open fields cases).
94. Id. at 1744.
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There is little question that the Supreme Court is disenchanted with the
exclusionary rule and has attempted to limit its force.95 Criticism of the exclu-
sionary rule began in the early 1970s. Justice Harlan, concurring in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire,9 6 noted that the deterrent effect of the rule in illegal searches
and seizures had not been proved.97 In Coolidge, Justice Black also stated his
view that the exclusionary rule is simply a judge-made rule and therefore is not
mandated by the fourth amendment. 98 Perhaps the bluntest statement, how-
ever, was that of Chief Justice Burger: "[The Coolidge] case illustrates the mon-
strous price we pay for the exclusionary rule in which we seem to have
imprisoned ourselves." 99
Since the early 1970s the Court has fashioned a number of exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. Illegally obtained evidence may be used before a grand
jury"'0 or to impeach a witness' testimony at trial. 10 ' Evidence obtained in vio-
lation of a third party's rights also may be used.' 0 2 Recently, the Court has
ruled that certain evidence which otherwise would have been discovered by legal
means is admissible, 10 3 and that the exclusionary rule should not apply when a
police officer, acting in good faith, discovers evidence pursuant to a warrant later
found to be invalid. 1° 4 By upholding a per se open fields rule, however, the
court did not create another exception to the exclusionary rule. Instead, the
Court eliminated the possibility of exclusion altogether by removing open fields
from the fourth amendment's scope. The Court did not denounce the exclusion-
ary rule explicitly; its attitude, however, can be inferred from the analytically
unnecessary phrase: "Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth
Amendment should shelter criminal activity . o"105
Equally evident-and explicit-in Oliver is an attempt to assist law enforce-
ment officials by an easily understood and easily applied bright-line rule. Justice
Powell stated:
95. See generally S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE (1977) (calling for nullification
of the exclusionary rule and predicting that the Supreme Court would do so); Geller, Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621 (noting
that the Supreme Court has chipped away at the exclusionary rule, but has not abandoned it); Miles,
Decline of the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 9 (1977)
(listing recent limitations on fourth amendment protections); Wilson, The Origin and Development of
the Federal Rule of Exclusion, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1073 (1982) (discussing the evolution of
the exclusionary rule); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 177-85 (1983) (discuss-
ing recent developments in the exclusionary rule).
96. 403 U.S. 443, 491 (1971).
97. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 491 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970)). In Coolidge defendant was convicted of
the murder of a 14 year-old girl. The conviction was reversed because evidence central to the case
had been discovered pursuant to an invalid warrant. Id. at 490.
98. Id. at 498-99 (Black, J., concurring in judgment).
99. Id. at 493 (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment).
100. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
101. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980).
102. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,
731 (1980).
103. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2511 (1984) (evidence obtained in violation of sixth
amendment right to counsel admissible if it would have been discovered by lawful means).
104. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
105. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1743 n.13.
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Nor would a case-by-case approach [to reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy] provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law
enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment
. . . . This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created
for courts, police and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of
Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing
circumstances. 10 6
The per se approach to open field searches arguably would promote expediency
in law enforcement by providing clear guidance to police officers and courts
regarding what actions are constitutional. The rule in Oliver also may assist
police "'in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand'- 107 by
avoiding the need to secure a warrant-and derivatively, the need to establish
probable cause.
Justice Marshall argued in dissent that a per se open fields rule in turn
would subject police officers to difficult spot judgments on how far the curtilage
extends from the home. 10 8 Although there is some cogence to this observation,
it is equally likely that the administrative advantages of the Oliver rule, which
exempts millions of acres of open fields from the fourth amendment, will out-
weigh any problems created. Moreover, judgments about the extent of the curti-
lage will be easier than those concerning what is a "reasonable expectation of
privacy." The presence of a nearby home or office is a physical reminder to law
enforcement officials that a fourth amendment issue may arise and that a war-
rant should be obtained when the extent of the curtilage is uncertain. A reason-
able expectation of privacy, however, is an abstract and difficult concept that
may not be appreciated in the course of a search.
It is difficult to find fault with the result in Oliver in light of the post-Katz
decisions. Permitting warrantless searches of fields inevitably entails the possi-
bility of abuse by the police. The law, however, should not turn on the mere
existence of a threat to privacy. Fourth amendment analysis now focuses on the
reasonableness of a law enforcement practice "by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interest against its promotion of legitimate gov-
ernment interests." 10 9 Oliver dealt with the enforcement of narcotics laws, an
area in which the government's interests in searching out illegal marijuana
plants in open fields is substantial, if not indisputable. The cultivation of mari-
juana naturally is dependent on the availability of remote and secluded tracts of
land. To combat the growth of marijuana, government agents must be able to
search these areas. Statistics on the cultivation of marijuana reinforce the gov-
ernment's interest in this area: Marijuana is the fourth largest cash crop in the
United States behind corn, soybeans, and wheat.I1 0 In 1981 the marijuana crop
106. Id. at 1742-43.
107. Note, Katz in the Open Fields, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 485, 502 (1983) (quoting United
States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1982)).
108. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
110. Grass was Never Greener, TIME, Aug. 9, 1982, at 15.
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had a street value of eight and one-half billion dollars." ' It would be a mistake,
however, to believe that the government's interest in open field searches is lim-
ited to discovering marijuana cultivation. Instead, its interest is coextensive with
a wide range of evidence of criminal activity that can be found in the open
fields. 112
The power to conduct open field searches facilitates the realization of an
important government objective. In this narrow context, the Court's decision
that no reasonable expectation of privacy can exist as a matter of law is justifi-
able. First, the privacy interest in a field, even one that is fenced and marked
with "no trespassing" signs, is not even remotely comparable to that involved in
the search of a home or office. Personal activites customarily are carried on in
the home. The same cannot be said of a field. Second, the disruptive effects of
an open field search are minimal. Even when no evidence is discovered, the
effects on individual privacy generally are inconsequential. 1 3 A search of a
house based on mistaken suspicions, however, would constitute a severe disrup-
tion of an area that normally is reserved for private affairs.11 4 For this reason,
the fourth amendment's requirement of a warrant based on probable cause is
necessary to protect the inherent privacy interest in a home. When the reduced
expectation of privacy in an open field is balanced against the government's need
to enforce its laws, it is reasonable to conclude that the protections of the fourth
amendment warrant clause are unnecessary. Last, it would be anomalous for
the Court to require a warrant for open fields when it permits warrantless
searches of automobiles on the basis of a reduced expectation of privacy."l 5 The
likelihood that a person will have personal effects which he desires to keep pri-
vate in a car are much greater than the possibility of his keeping the same per-
sonal effects in an open field.
By balancing the government's need to enforce its laws against a tenuous
privacy interest in open fields, the Supreme Court preserved the open fields doc-
trine of Hester within the analytical framework of Katz. Had the analysis
stopped there, Oliver might have been viewed simply as a conservative, pro-law
enforcement interpretation of the fourth amendment. The Court, however, of-
fered a second and independent justification for its decision: The exclusion of
111. Id.; see also The MarUuana Wars, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1983, at 22 (estimates of the size
of the American marijuana crop).
112. The brief for the United States mentioned these possibilities:
Suppose, for instance, that the police receive an anonymous tip that a kidnap victim is
being held in the woods inside posted and fenced private property or that a cache of auto-
matic weapons is hidden in a wheat field on a large, fenced farm. Or suppose that an EPA
inspector receives information that hazardous chemicals are being illegally dumped near a
stream running through such property.
Brief for the United States at 31, Oliver. Stolen property, dead bodies, and murder weapons can be
added to this incomplete list.
113. The United States offered this analysis in its brief: "the police will observe nothing but a
field and perhaps some cornstalks, or cows; an individual is highly unlikely to keep exposed in an
open field effects that he wishes to keep private." Id. at 34-35. When unjustified intrusions occur,
the victim retains a cause of action for damages. See, eg., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
114. Brief for the United States at 30-35, Oliver.
115. See J. HALL, supra note 27, § 9:8; 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 26, § 7.2(a).
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open fields from the fourth amendment's protection is based on the express lan-
guage of the amendment. The Court virtually reiterated Justice Holmes' reason-
ing in Hester that an open field is embraced neither by the term "houses" nor the
term "effects" in the fourth amendment. 116
To justify its apparent retreat from Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-pri-
vacy rule, the Court noted:
This Court frequently has relied on the explicit language of the Fourth
Amendment as delineating the scope of its affirmative protections. See,
e.g., Robbins v. California. . .; Payton v. New York . .; Alderman v.
United States.
As these cases, decided after Katz, indicate, Katz's "reasonable
expectation of privacy" standard did not sever Fourth Amendment
doctrine from the Amendment's language. Katz itself construed the
Amendment's protection of the person against unreasonable searches
to encompass electronic eavesdropping of telephone conversations
sought to be kept private; and Katz's fundamental recognition that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-
against unreasonable searches and seizures," . . . is faithful to the
Amendment's language. As Katz demonstrates, the Court fairly may
respect the constraints of the Constitution's language without wedding
itself to a [sic] unreasoning literalism .... 117
The Court's reliance on the express language of the fourth amendment is
perplexing. A plain-language reading of the amendment was unnecessary; the
same result was possible, and indeed realized, by a reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy analysis. Furthermore, an assertion that the fourth amendment's pro-
tections are limited by its express language contradicts Katz and subsequent
cases. In Smith v. Maryland 118 the Court stated: "Consistently with Katz, this
Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment de-
pends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a
'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by
government action . ... 119 Earlier, in Chadwick v. United States,'20 the
Court had observed: "We do not agree that the Warrant Clause protects only
dwellings and other specifically designated locales. As we have noted before, the
Fourth Amendment 'protects people, not places,'. . .; more particularly, it pro-
tects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy."121
The cases cited by the majority also do not support a contention that the
Court has relied on the express language of the fourth amendment to limit the
scope of its protections. In Robbins v. California,12 2 the Court had ruled that a
116. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
117. Id. at 1740 n.6.
118. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
119. Id. at 740.
120. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
121. Id. at 7.
122. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
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driver had an expectation of privacy in a wrapped package of marijuana found in
a trunk.1 23 In Payton v. New York, 12 4 the Court had overruled a New York
statute that allowed police officers to enter private residences to make routine
felony arrests. The Court referred to the amendment's language to demonstrate
that the prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures applied to arrests
in the home as well as searches.125 The Court, therefore, used the language of
the amendment to equate the protection against seizures with that against
searches; it did not rely on the language to limit the scope of protection itself.
Finally, Alderman v. United States,126 had been decided only two years after
Katz and long before the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy rule had been elabo-
rated by the Court. None of the cases indicate that the Katz reasonable-expecta-
tion-of-privacy rule is inappropriate.
If a plain language reading of the fourth amendment is unnecessary and
inappropriate to the result in Oliver, why did the Court offer it as an alternative
justification for the open fields doctrine? Justice Marshall suggested that:
Sensitive to the weakness of its argument that the "persons and things"
mentioned in the Fourth Amendment exhaust the coverage of the pro-
vision, the Court goes on to analyze at length the privacy interests that
might legitimately be asserted in "open fields." The inclusion of Parts
III and IV in the opinion, [-the expectation of privacy analysis-]
coupled with the Court's reaffirmation of Katz and progeny . . .
strongly suggest that the plain-language theory sketched in Part II of
the Court's opinion will have little or no effect on our future decisions
in this area. 127
Perhaps this will hold true. On the other hand, Oliver's literal reading of
the fourth amendment may suggest a fundamental dissatisfaction with the ex-
panded fourth amendment protections required by Katz. This sentiment may be
implicit in the Court's assertion that "the rule [of Hester] is true to the concep-
tion of the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment. The Amend-
ment reflects the recognition of the Founders that certain enclaves should be free
from arbitrary government interference." 128 Indeed, if interpreted from this
perspective, the Court's footnote can be read as an assertion that Katz simply
defined electronic surveillance as an unreasonable intrusion against the "per-
son"-an interpretation consistent with a literal reading of the fourth amend-
ment-and thus was not intended to extend fourth amendment protections
further than its language implied.
If this is the sentiment of the Court, it must realize that the Katz balancing
test is too well entrenched to be simply overruled. Any retreat from Katz must
123. The Court referred to the language of the fourth amendment to hold that there was no
distinction between a "personal" and an "impersonal" effect for the purpose of protection. The
Robbins decision, however, turned on the reasonable expectation of privacy that defendant had in a
closed container. Id. at 426-29.
124. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
125. Id. at 585-90.
126. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
127. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1746 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1741 (emphasis added).
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be slow and deliberate, much like the current trend against the exclusionary
rule. The Court's immediate objective, however, has been attained: the powers
of law enforcement have been strengthened by the exclusion of open fields from
the protection of the fourth amendment.
Oliver resolved the open fields question. Fourth amendment protections do
not apply to open fields. Oliver, however, has planted the seeds of controversy.
Fourth amendment law is forged from the tension between each citizen's desire
to be free of governmental intrusion upon his privacy and society's need to en-
force its laws. The Court's rulings ideally will preserve at least those privacy
interests -necessary to maintain individual freedom. By finding that privacy in
the open fields is not an interest thai society recognizes as reasonable, the Court
has decided that such privacy is not essential to the maintenance of a free soci-
ety; that the benefits of privacy in the open fields are so marginal that they
should yield to society's need for effective law enforcement. That much is set-
tled. The Court also may jiave initiated a fundamental change in fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence. By offering alternative justifications for its ruling, the Court
may ha:ve signaled the eventual decline of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
rule in favor of a plainanguage theory of the fourth amendment.
JAMES LEONARD
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